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E-mail addresses: rcwang@ust.hk (R. Wang), yaoDual-listed ﬁrms simultaneously follow the relevant rules in their home country and in
their cross-listed country. In contrast, other ﬁrms only listed in the cross-listed country
are only subject to the local regulations. Previous literature has found evidence that
cross-listing can improve ﬁrms’ information transparency because of more stringent listing
rules in the cross-listed country. The existing research, however, has not paid enough
attention to the potential inﬂuence of dual-listed ﬁrms and their home country institu-
tional factors (e.g. unique disclosure policies) on other ﬁrms only listed in the cross-listed
country (i.e. spillover effect). In the Hong Kong market, Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms are under
the mandatory proﬁt warning regulation of mainland China, but other ﬁrms listed only in
Hong Kong only need to follow the voluntary disclosure rule of the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. Such a setting provides us with the opportunity to investigate a spillover effect,
i.e. whether these Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms inﬂuence their peers only listed in Hong Kong
to release proﬁt warnings. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms only listed in Hong Kong are more likely to
issue proﬁt warnings if their Chinese dual-listed peers have also issued warnings. We fur-
ther ﬁnd that this spillover effect increases with the market capitalization of Chinese dual-
listed ﬁrms and increases with the market share of these ﬁrms before they dominate the
industry. Lastly, due to an underlying duty to disclose material information in Hong Kong,
the spillover effect is weaker for ﬁrms with large earnings surprises.
 2011 China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
University of Hong Kong. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.‘‘Usually advanced markets like the US, the UK and Australia do not have proﬁt-warning requirements and I do not think Hong
Kong should have such a requirement.’’
– Mark Dickens, HKSEnal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
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Fig. 1. Two effects in the cross-listing setting.
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Mark Dickens, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s newly appointed listings head has urged the government to toughen pen-
alties on companies that fail to disclose price-sensitive information to the market. But Mr. Dickens rejected suggestions that
Hong Kong needed to follow the mainland in introducing a speciﬁc proﬁt-warning threshold. Given that timely proﬁt warn-
ings can reduce information asymmetry and reduce proﬁts from insider trading, setting regulatory standards appropriately
requires intimate knowledge of different rules and their consequences. This study investigates the nature and extent of the
externality from mainland China’s proﬁt warning regulation over listed ﬁrms in the Hong Kong market.
In a typical cross-listing setting (see Fig. 1), there are two groups of ﬁrms: cross-listed ﬁrms and non-cross-listed ﬁrms.
Some of the cross-listed ﬁrms also issue shares in their own country (‘‘dual-listed ﬁrms’’ hereafter). These dual-listed ﬁrms
need to comply with two sets of regulations: the regulations in their own country and the regulations in the cross-listed
country, Market X. In contrast, other ﬁrms only listed in Market X (‘‘non-dual-listed ﬁrms’’ hereafter) merely need to comply
with the regulations of Market X. Obviously, the regulations in Market X have an impact on these dual-listed ﬁrms, which we
call the ‘‘bonding effect’’.1 Meanwhile, it is possible that the regulations in the dual-listed ﬁrms’ home countries can also affect
the behavior of non-dual-listed ﬁrms in Market X through the inﬂuence of dual-listed ﬁrms, which we call the ‘‘spillover effect’’.
Up to now, most cross-listing literature has focused on the bonding effect on cross-listed ﬁrms. Recent empirical work
shows that foreign ﬁrms with cross listings in the U.S. raise more external ﬁnance, have higher valuations, a lower cost of
capital, higher analyst following and report higher quality accounting numbers than their counterparts in their own coun-
tries (Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lang et al., 2003a,b; Doidge et al., 2004; Bailey et al., 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2006). However,
it is important to remember that dual-listed ﬁrms are subject to the relevant laws and regulations in both their home coun-
tries and the cross-listed country. Licht (2003), Leuz (2006) and Leuz and Wysocki (2008) indicate that the existing research
has not paid enough attention to the potential inﬂuence of institutional factors from the dual-listed ﬁrms’ home countries
(e.g. unique disclosure policies) on non-dual-listed ﬁrms’ voluntary disclosure in the cross-listed country. Therefore, in this
paper, we examine this ‘‘spillover effect’’, by exploring whether Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms that are required to follow main-
land China’s disclosure rules have an inﬂuence on other ﬁrms only listed in the Hong Kong market to make proﬁt warnings.
Accordingly, our study focuses on the ‘‘spillover effect’’ of regulations and raises the research question: Does a spillover
effect of regulation exist? Specially, we examine the spillover effect of mainland China’s regulations on other ﬁrms only
listed in the Hong Kong market (H shares, Red Chips and others) through the inﬂuence of Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms. We
use a sample of 298 proﬁt warnings in Hong Kong from 2003 to 2009 and ﬁnd that Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms push the
non-dual-listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong towards better transparency by issuing proﬁt warnings. That is, non-dual-listed ﬁrms
in Hong Kong are more likely to issue proﬁt warnings if their Chinese dual-listed peers have also issued warnings. We further
ﬁnd that this spillover effect increases with the market capitalization of Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms and increases with the
market share of these ﬁrms before they dominate the industry. The spillover effect, however, diminishes with an increase
in the earnings surprise of the non-dual-listed ﬁrms. This implies that ﬁrm disclosure behavior is more likely to be1 That is, ﬁrms can opt into a foreign regime and thereby bond themselves to the more onerous disclosure, accounting and governance requirements and
stricter enforcement regime of another country, which is called the bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999).
R. Wang, Y. Zhang / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 63–80 65independent of their peer’s actions if the disclosed information is material. Such results are consistent with and extend the
ﬁndings of Heitzman et al. (2010).
Since we argue that the spillover effect of proﬁt warnings is due to a common market/industry environment, we perform
additional analysis to corroborate this conjecture. Our additional checks repeat the main regression analysis by replacing the
full sample of non-dual-listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong with two subsamples: non-dual-listed ﬁrms with a major Chinese share-
holder (H shares and Red Chips) and a matched sample by size and industry. Because H shares, Red Chips and size-industry
matched ﬁrms share more ﬁrm characteristics with Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms than other ﬁrms only listed in Hong Kong
(Albuquerque, 2009), we expect that the common market/industry environment is likely to be more pronounced in these
subsamples. Consistent with this prediction, we ﬁnd that the spillover effect is primarily driven by ﬁrms in these subsam-
ples. We also ﬁnd that our main results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests, including the reclassiﬁcation of peers by
one-digit SIC codes and Datastream sectors, and an alternative proxy for spillover effects from Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms.
We view our paper as making four main contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on cross-listed ﬁrms and their
behavior. Prior literature focuses on the bonding effects of cross listing. These studies largely ignore the impact of those
cross-listed ﬁrms on other participants only listed in the host market (spillover effect). In our study, we investigate this less
explored ‘‘spillover’’ effect. We ﬁnd that the behavior of dual-listed ﬁrms, largely due to their home country institutional fac-
tors (e.g. unique disclosure policies), does have an inﬂuence on other ﬁrms only listed in the cross-listed country.
Second, we extend and complement prior literature on voluntary disclosure, especially studies related to multiple-ﬁrm
disclosure settings (Tse and Tucker, 2010). While prior studies examine the timing of earnings disclosures in a multiple-ﬁrm
setting, our paper examines the choice of ﬁrms to disclose or not disclose earnings information in a multiple-ﬁrm setting. In
addition, our study provides evidence that supports the ‘‘information transfer’’ story. That is, common factors that ﬁrms in
the same equity market share with each other are one of the major reasons that their disclosure behavior is interdependent.
Third, our evidence also contributes to the emerging literature that examines relationships between mandatory and vol-
untary disclosure practices. While prior literature shows that the materiality of information inﬂuences disclosure decisions
in a single ﬁrm setting, our study extends this point to a multiple-ﬁrm setting by showing that the materiality of information
also moderates the interdependence of voluntary disclosure (Heitzman et al., 2010). Our study also offers some international
evidence on the importance of the materiality of information.
Fourth, our study has some regulatory implications. We ﬁnd that the regulatory environment in China has an effect on the
behavior of Hong Kong ﬁrms through the behavior of Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms. This shows that the regulations of one coun-
try can have an indirect impact on the disclosure environment in another country, something regulators and other market
participants should take into account when making policy decisions. For example, when Hong Kong policy makers and prac-
titioners debate about whether to follow the regulation of mainland China, they should know that the mainland regulation
already has an impact on the market participants in Hong Kong.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional background of the Hong Kong
market, including the market structure and proﬁt warning rules. In Section 3 we discuss previous literature and develop
hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design and Section 5 provides the sample selection and test results. Additional
checks are discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2. Institutional background
In this section, we discuss the Hong Kong market structure and the proﬁt warning regulations in Hong Kong and mainland
China.
2.1. Hong Kong market structure
In this study, we categorize listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong into two groups: (1) Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms, which trade both in
mainland China (e.g. Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchanges) and Hong Kong (‘‘AH ﬁrms’’ hereafter) and are subject to the
rules of both exchanges; (2) other ﬁrms (‘‘non-AH ﬁrms’’ hereafter) that are not listed in mainland China, but are listed in
Hong Kong.2
In the last twenty years, over 200 Chinese ﬁrms (AH, H and Red Chip ﬁrms) have listed in the Hong Kong market.3 These
ﬁrms have become so important that they now account for more than half of the market capitalization and more than 60% of
equity turnover on the main board.4 Among these China-based ﬁrms, 57 are AH ﬁrms. These AH ﬁrms are usually giants in their2 Among non-AH ﬁrms in Hong Kong, there are three sub-groups. First, Red Chip shares refer to mainland Chinese controlled ﬁrms that are incorporated
outside China (Hong Kong, Bermuda, or the Cayman Islands) and trade on the HK Stock Exchange. Red Chips function primarily as foreign subsidiaries of the
parent’s operations in mainland China. Their assets and earnings have signiﬁcant mainland Chinese exposure, but except for the regulations on the HK Stock
Exchange, there are no ‘explicit’ additional listing and disclosure requirements for Red Chips. Second, incorporated in mainland China, H shares are subject to
mainland China’s Company Law. Third, local ﬁrms and other shares comprise the rest of the listed ﬁrms not included in the above two groups in Hong Kong. In
our study, we recognize these within-group (non-AH ﬁrms) differences between local ﬁrms and China-afﬁliated ﬁrms (Red Chips and H shares). Therefore, all
analysis is also conducted on the non-China-afﬁliated ﬁrm subsample.
3 Up to April 30, 2009, there are 100 H share ﬁrms and 92 Red Chip ﬁrms listed on the main board. There are also 40 H share ﬁrms and 4 Red Chip ﬁrms listed
on the GEM. (Data resource: http://www.HKSE.com.hk/data/chidimen/chidimen.htm).
4 More details can be found at: http://www.HKSE.com.hk/data/chidimen/CD_TO.htm
Table 1
The regulation on proﬁt warnings in mainland China.
Period Deadlines (M)a Frequency Thresholds
Before 1998 N/A N/A N/A
1998–2000 2 Annual (1) Substantial loss; (2) loss that will continue in three consecutive years
2001–2005 1 (A)b; 0.5 (I)c Annual; interim (1) Loss; (2) >50% change in earnings
After 2005 1 Annual; interim; 1st quarter (1) Loss; (2) >50% change in earnings; (3) loss to proﬁt
a Number of months.
b Annual.
c Interim.
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board (calculated on April 30th 2009).2.2. Proﬁt warning regulations
In this paper, we focus on one particular event—proﬁt warnings—to test for a spillover effect. We do so for two rea-
sons: (1) both mainland China and Hong Kong have regulations on proﬁt warnings and the differences in the two reg-
ulations exactly satisfy our requirements to produce a spillover effect; (2) after two big companies5 in Hong Kong were
found to breach the proﬁt warning disclosure rules, professionals suggested that the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (‘‘HKSE’’,
hereafter) should follow the mainland in introducing speciﬁc proﬁt-warning regulations.6 Therefore, we think it is helpful
for regulators to know: under the current situation, what is the impact of mainland China’s regulation on the listed ﬁrms
in Hong Kong.2.2.1. Regulation in mainland China
The regulation on proﬁt warnings has passed through four periods in China: (1) before 1998, no rules regarding prof-
it warnings existed; (2) From 1998 to 2000, listed ﬁrms must make a proﬁt warning within two months after the ﬁscal
year end if they incur a substantial loss or loss that will continue in three consecutive years. Four points are worth
noting during this period. First, ﬁrms only need to make a proﬁt warning when they incur a loss. Second, the rules
are only effective on annual earnings. Third, there is no clear threshold: whether it is ‘‘substantial’’ depends on man-
agement’s judgment. Fourth, management is not required to make any forecast, only an announcement; (3) From
2001 to 2005, the rules become more complicated and began to cover interim earnings. Listed ﬁrms need to issue a
proﬁt warning once their earnings changes by more than 50% from last year or if they incur a loss. Additionally, the
deadline for such a warning is one month after the ﬁscal period end for annual earnings and half a month for interim
earnings; (4) Three changes were made to the rule after 2005. First, the rule now includes earnings in ﬁrst quarter.
Second, the deadlines for all proﬁt warnings (annual, quarterly, and half-year) are one month after the ﬁscal period.
Third, a new threshold is added: listed ﬁrms are now required to issue a warning if their earnings changes from a loss
to a proﬁt. Fourth, ﬁrms are encouraged to issue a proﬁt warning before the end of the ﬁscal period. We summarize
this information in Table 1.2.2.2. Regulation in Hong Kong
The ‘‘Listing Rules’’ in Hong Kong require listed ﬁrms to make timely public disclose of price-sensitive information.7 But
this minimum mandatory standard does not deﬁne the meaning of the term ‘‘material’’ and the exact mechanism of how infor-
mation should be disclosed to the public. In order to help issuers and their directors fulﬁll their obligations under the Listing
Rules, HKSE introduced the ‘‘Guide on Disclosure of Price-Sensitive Information’’ on January 7, 2002. Speciﬁcally, Rules 13,
15 and 17 of HKSE require companies to promptly issue an announcement warning investors of the likely impact once they
become aware that their ﬁnancial results may be signiﬁcantly worse than the generally accepted market expectation.
Thus, compared with AH ﬁrms that are also under mainland China’s regulation, non-AH ﬁrms, i.e. other ﬁrms only listed
in Hong Kong, have a voluntary disclosure environment for proﬁt warnings. In addition, the thresholds of warnings are
decided by managers, the timing of the proﬁt warnings are decided by managers and only bad news is emphasized in the
guidance in Hong Kong.5 For CITIC Paciﬁc, a review of the audited accounts of the company for the ﬁnancial year ending 31 December 2007 as well as its interim accounts for the 6
months to 30 June 2008 does not reveal any material exposure to leveraged foreign exchange contracts, let alone one as substantial as that which was disclosed
in its proﬁt warning.In March, 2009, the Democratic Party reprimanded HSBC Holdings for not issuing a proﬁt warning before announcing an earnings plunge of
70% on huge provisions for its United States business. The bank defended its decision to make the write-down just before the results announcement.
6 ‘‘Southern China Moring Post: Tougher disclosure penalties sought – Listings chief says law change needed to ensure ﬁrms comply with price-sensitive news’’ by
Enoch Yiu on April 18, 2009.
7 See paragraph 2 of Appendix 7 of the Main Board Rules (the ‘‘Listing Agreement’’) and Rule 17.10 of the GEM Rules.
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3.1. Literature review
Up to now, most cross-listing literature has focused on the ‘‘bonding effect’’ on cross-listed ﬁrms. Reese and Weisbach
(2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms can get more external ﬁnancing following cross-listing. Lang et al. (2003a) document that ﬁrms have
higher analyst following and higher valuations after cross listing. In addition, previous research suggests that cross-listed
ﬁrms experience improvement in accounting quality in the post-cross-listing period (Lang et al., 2003b). Doidge et al.
(2004) also report that foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the U.S. have Tobin’s q ratios that are 16.5% higher than
the q ratios of non-cross-listed ﬁrms from the same country. Bailey et al. (2006) show that changes in the cross-listed ﬁrm’s
disclosure environment signiﬁcantly affects its stock return and trading volume response to earnings announcements. Hail
and Leuz (2006) provide strong evidence that cross-listing on a U.S. exchange reduces ﬁrms’ cost of capital. However, Licht
(2003), Leuz (2006) and Leuz and Wysocki (2008) indicate that the existing research has not paid enough attention to the
potential inﬂuence of institutional factors from the dual-listed ﬁrms’ home countries (e.g. unique disclosure policies) on
non-dual-listed ﬁrms’ voluntary disclosure in the cross-listed country.
The decision on whether to warn or not to warn has been studied extensively. Kasznik and Lev (1995) investigate man-
agement’s discretionary disclosures prior to a large earnings surprise. They ﬁnd the likelihood of warnings to be positively
associated with the magnitude of the earnings surprise, ﬁrm size and membership in the high technology industry. Tucker
(2007) also shows that ﬁrms with a larger amount of unfavorable non-earnings news are more likely to warn. Using the par-
tial observability discrete choice model, Heitzman et al. (2010) demonstrate that not merely voluntary disclosure incentives
(Verrecchia, 1983, 2001) but also managers’ obligation to disclose material information forces managers to disclose private
information.
Besides the above studies on single-ﬁrm decisions, early in 1989, Pownall and Waymire examine whether information
transfer from intra-industry ﬁrms is a substitute for voluntary disclosure by their peers. Dye and Sridhar (1995) also explore
this area by introducing a model in a multiple-ﬁrm setting. They show that as long as there is a positive correlation among
ﬁrms’ receipt of information, one ﬁrm’s disclosure will cause investors to revise their perception of other ﬁrms. This will in-
crease the probability that other ﬁrms will disclose their information. Recently Acharya et al. (2008) also propose that the
reduced mean of the posterior distribution of ﬁrm value lowers the disclosure threshold and consequently some bad news
that was previously withheld is now disclosed. Brown et al. (2004) and Tse and Tucker (2010) empirically investigate this
‘‘interdependent’’ behavior. Speciﬁcally, assuming that an earnings surprise can be caused by a combination of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors and market or industry factors external to the ﬁrm, Tse and Tucker (2010) ﬁnd that managers time their warnings to
occur soon after their industry peers’ warnings to minimize their apparent responsibility for earnings shortfalls. However,
they only investigate this interdependence by the type of news, not by the magnitude of the earnings news. These multi-
ple-ﬁrm studies imply that information transfer from intra-industry ﬁrms does not substitute for voluntary disclosure by
their peers, but voluntary disclosure by intra-industry ﬁrms is correlated with each other.3.2. Spillovers in Hong Kong
First of all, managers in Hong Kong are reluctant to disclose information voluntarily.8 Previous literature shows that when
managers’ and investors’ preferences are not aligned, managers are reluctant to disclose information (Lo, 2003; Nagar et al.,
2003). The more severe the principal-agent problems are, the less likely managers disclose private information. Chinese ﬁrms
and other ﬁrms in Hong Kong (mainly family ﬁrms) have been consistently highlighted as having severe principal-agent prob-
lems and pervasive expropriation from small shareholders (Berkman et al., 2009; Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Cheung et al.,
2006). The pervasiveness of insider trading is one reason for managers in Hong Kong to withhold information. Cheng and Leung
(2006) ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant net insider-buying activities before the announcement of good news and signiﬁcant net-
insider-selling activities before bad news in Hong Kong. What’s more, Guanxi, informal relationships to exchange favors, dom-
inate business activity throughout China and East Asia. Chinese tend to rely on private communication through ‘‘guanxi’’ rather
than through public information channels. For information suppliers, they build up their long-term relationships with potential
or current interested parties to save formal contracting costs by leaking private information earlier to these parties who can
make proﬁts from such an information advantage (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Lovett et al., 1999). Based on these reasons discussed
above, we expect that voluntary disclosure is poor in the Hong Kong market. In other words, it is reasonable to conjecture that,
ceteris paribus, without a mandatory proﬁt warning regulation, when investors are not sure whether a manager has private
information, in equilibrium only ﬁrms that have sufﬁciently positive news will release their information. Similarly, ﬁrms with
more negative information will prefer to keep their market value higher—at least temporarily—by claiming that they do not yet8 The newly appointed Chairman of Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Mark Dickson talked about disclosure in Hong Kong in an interview: ‘‘I am not happy with
the disclosure of price-sensitive information in Hong Kong as some listed companies do not have the culture of making continuous disclosure of price-sensitive
information.’’ See ‘‘Southern China Moring Post: Tougher disclosure penalties sought – Listings chief says law change needed to ensure ﬁrms comply with price-
sensitive news’’ by Enoch Yiu on April 18, 2009.
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earnings make proﬁt warnings.9
Second, as discussed above, the rules in mainland China require AH ﬁrms to announce their proﬁt warnings no later than
one month after the ﬁscal period end. Under this rule, AH ﬁrms disclose their big surprises in earnings more than 42 days
earlier than non-AH ﬁrms that have no such deadline to disclose on average (13.42 vs. 29.41 days). The result arises after
controlling for industry and ﬁrm size. This shows that most non-AH ﬁrms issue warnings about their earnings as late as pos-
sible, even several days before the earnings announcement date. As a result, most non-AH ﬁrms can learn from information
disclosed by their AH peers and decide whether to warn or not afterward.
Third, we argue that the issuance of proﬁt warnings by AH ﬁrms in the same industries will affect the issuance of proﬁt
warnings by their peers. Given that investors are not sure whether a manager has private information, in equilibrium only
ﬁrms that have sufﬁciently positive news will release their information, and ﬁrms with more negative information will pre-
fer to keep their market value higher by claiming that they do not yet have any information to report. While in a multi-ﬁrm
setting, investors are informed of what a non-disclosing manager should know from a peer ﬁrm’s disclosures, so non-disclos-
ing managers cannot get the same equilibrium payoff by keeping silent (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch,
1992; Dye and Sridhar, 1995). In the Hong Kong market, when a AH ﬁrm issues a proﬁt warning to follow mainland China’s
regulation, investors are informed of what a non-AH manager should know, because the AH peer’s news shares a common
market/industry environment with its non-AH counterpart. Therefore, the non-AH peer manager would be more likely to
make a good news announcement to show she also has competitive managerial talent (Trueman, 1986). Also, the non-AH
peer manager would be more likely to make a bad news announcement as long as she believes that investors are less likely
to hold her responsible for bad news when other ﬁrms also issue bad news, thereby lowering their penalty for the earnings
shortfall (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Acharya et al., 2008; Tse and Tucker, 2010).
Hypothesis 1. Non-AH ﬁrms are more likely to issue proﬁt warnings if their AH peers make proﬁt warning announcements.
That AH peer’s news shares a common market/industry environment with the non-AH counterpart is the key assumption
for this spillover effect. In other words, AH peer’s news is informative for investors’ judgments regarding the earnings’ news
of non-AH ﬁrms (Dye and Sridhar, 1995). The more common factors the two groups share, the higher the probability that a
non-AH ﬁrm will warn if AH peers warn. Here we further construct two subsamples of non-AH ﬁrms. These two subsamples
share more common market/industry environments with AH ﬁrms. First, we create a sub-group of non-AH ﬁrms only com-
posed of Red Chips and H share ﬁrms. Red Chips and H share ﬁrms are Chinese ﬁrms listed in Hong Kong.10 Most of those
companies are doing business in Mainland China. It is long recognized that H shares and Red Chips share many common insti-
tutional and market factors with AH ﬁrms. Therefore, we predict that the spillover effect will be more pronounced when the
non-AH peers of AH ﬁrms are H shares and Red chips. Second, industry factors play an important role in determining ﬁrms’
earnings and inﬂuence executive’s decisions. Companies in the same industry, however, may vary a lot in many aspects so that
managers and investors do not think these companies are actual peers of AH ﬁrms. If the investors and managers of a non-AH
ﬁrm do not think the AH ﬁrm is a comparable ﬁrm, then the warning of this AH ﬁrm would have little impact on the non-AH
ﬁrm. To mitigate this concern, we use a size-industry matched sample to build a more comparable peer group of AH ﬁrms.11
Supported by Albuquerque (2009), the method of picking peers matched on size and industry is a better way to ﬁnd peers based
on similar ﬁrm characteristics. We also predict that the spillover effect will be more pronounced in these two new peer groups.
In sum, we propose the following two hypotheses12:
Hypothesis 2a. The likelihood that non-AH ﬁrms do warn if their AH peers make proﬁt warning announcements is more
pronounced when non-AH ﬁrms are H shares and Red Chips.Hypothesis 2b. The likelihood that non-AH ﬁrms do warn if their AH peers make proﬁt warning announcements is more
pronounced when non-AH ﬁrms are matched by industry and size.9 See the detail in Fig. 2b.
10 Companies incorporated in the Mainland and approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission for a listing in Hong Kong are called H share
companies, the letter H stands for Hong Kong. H-share companies are traded in Hong Kong dollars, but ﬁnancial statements are reported in RMB yuan. A
Chinese controlled company incorporated and listed in Hong Kong is called a ‘‘red chip’’ company, the word red comes from ‘‘red China’’ (Trenck et al., 1998).
Red chips are trading in Hong Kong dollars, ﬁnancial statements are also reported in the same currency. Recently, these distinctions between H-shares and red
Chips have become blurred. Many leading companies are issued as red chips, such as China Mobile, China Insurance and China National Offshore Oil Corp. At the
same time, a larger number of small companies, including private enterprises, are classiﬁed as H shares.
11 We also realize that interdependence between Red Chips, H shares and AH ﬁrms might be due to their common political preference of Chinese
shareholders, not simply because of their economic incentives we hypothesize in our study. The size-industry matched sample emphasizes the economic rather
than political incentives. Therefore, this alternative subsample mitigates this concern.
12 We recognize that an alternative peer group could be built in terms of howmuch sales of non-AH ﬁrms come frommainland China. Such composition could
better reﬂect the common factors of business and industry environment than the one based on their shareholders (Red Chips and H shares vs. local ﬁrms). We
have two methods to access the data in need: (1) geographic segment disclosure or (2) Hang Seng China afﬁliated ﬁrm index composite that includes some
listed ﬁrms with more than 50% sales from mainland China. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain available data from (1). And we would further lose too many
observations if we use the composite index. This is one of the limitations of our study.
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industry-speciﬁc information is reﬂected ﬁrst in the stock prices of industry leaders and then spreads to other ﬁrms, result-
ing in a lead-lag relationship between the stock returns of industry leaders and industry followers. Speciﬁcally, industry
leaders are the ﬁrms who are more liquid, have bigger size, have greater market share and are covered by more analysts.
Therefore, in the Hong Kong market, the information transfer from leading AH ﬁrms to follower non-AH ﬁrms shall become
more pronounced with the growth of AH ﬁrms in terms of their relative market capitalization and market share. In sum, we
propose the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a. The likelihood that non-AH ﬁrms do warn if their AH peers make proﬁt warning announcements is more
pronounced when AH peers have greater market capitalization on HKSE.Hypothesis 3b. The likelihood that non-AH ﬁrms do warn if their AH peers make proﬁt warning announcements is more
pronounced when AH peers have greater market share in the industry.
Under theproﬁtwarning rules inmainlandChina, AHﬁrmsare only required towarnabout their earningsnews if the change
in earnings is larger than 50%, earnings are negative and earnings change between positive and negative. On the other hand,
Heitzman et al. (2010) demonstrate that the incentives to voluntarily disclose information must recognize that such informa-
tion is oftendisclosedbecauseof anunderlyingduty todisclose.Under thismateriality framework, independent of the costs the
ﬁrmmight incur as a result (e.g. proprietary costs), themanagerdiscloseswarning informationwhen themagnitudeof earnings
news is greater than the threshold of materiality. In other words, the behavior of ﬁrms with higher magnitudes of earnings
changes would become more independent of the behavior of their peers. Therefore, it is important to examine whether this
spillover effect varies with the magnitude of the earnings news. We expect that the spillover effect from AH peers is not linear
and becomes weaker with an increase in the magnitude of earnings news. This hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship in H1 is attenuated when the magnitude of earnings surprise of non-AH ﬁrms is
greater.
Last but not least, it is important to remember that the spillover effect from AH to non-AH ﬁrms in our study is not asym-
metric. That is, the interdependence of proﬁt warnings between AH and non-AH ﬁrms works for both good and bad news.
Meanwhile, one confounding factor in the chosen setting is the effect of litigation risk on bad news disclosure. As proposed
by the voluntary disclosure rule on HKSE, only bad news is emphasized in the guidance. Therefore, if we only ﬁnd evidence of
the interdependence of proﬁt warnings between AH and non-AH ﬁrms when they have bad news, but not good news, then
we cannot reject the alternative explanation that what we document is simply a post hoc fallacy. That is, in a negative market
shock, a non-AH manager will warn about its bad news to mitigate its litigation risk, no matter whether or not there is a AH
peer manager who discloses their bad news to the market. In the real world, to meet the deadline of the regulation in main-
land China, a AH ﬁrm has to issue bad news far earlier than the non-AH peer. The post hoc relationship between AH and non-
AH ﬁrms does not come from an interdependent decision-making process, but mechanically does appear because they share
common/industry factors and different deadline requirements.
Therefore, it is a must to do an additional test, here to reduce the chance of error from this possible post hoc fallacy in our
study. Acharya et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the reduced mean of the posterior distribution of ﬁrm value lowers the disclosure
threshold and consequently some news that was previously withheld is now disclosed. Hypothesis 4 gives us an opportunity
to ﬁnd whether there are non-AH managers who may NOT warn in a single ﬁrm setting, but they issue warnings if AH peers
do so. Specially, if spillover effects from AH ﬁrms exist, non-AH ﬁrms with relatively immaterial earnings news (e.g. less than
50% earnings changes) will still be likely to warn when AH ﬁrms disclose a 50% material change in earnings news. So non-AH
ﬁrms with immaterial earnings surprise comprise a more powerful sample to justify our spillover effect, i.e. a positive rela-
tionship in the lower earnings change partition strengthens the power of the evidence in H1.
4. Research design
4.1. Variable deﬁnitions
For the main variable, we measure AH peer’s spillover effect by constructing AHONLY, an indicator variable set equal to 1
if AND ONLY if for non-AH ﬁrm i in industry j, no other non-AH ﬁrms made but at least one AH ﬁrm in industry j made a
proﬁt warning before ﬁrm i’s action.13 ‘‘Peers’’ in our main tests are deﬁned as companies in the same industry group via
two-digit SIC codes.13 The proxy, AHONLY, will underestimate the spillover effect. There are other 4 scenarios of lead-follow warning relations: (1) for non-AH ﬁrm i in industry j,
both AH and non-AH ﬁrms made proﬁt warnings before ﬁrm i’s action. And a AH ﬁrm is the lead ﬁrm; (2) for non-AH ﬁrm i in industry j, both AH and non-AH
ﬁrms made proﬁt warnings before ﬁrm i’s action. And a non-AH ﬁrm is the lead ﬁrm; (3) For non-AH ﬁrm i in industry j, no AH ﬁrms made but at least a non-AH
ﬁrm in industry j made a proﬁt warning before ﬁrm i’s action; (4) for non-AH ﬁrm i in industry j, this non-AH ﬁrm is the lead ﬁrm to make proﬁt warning in
industry j. We also construe these scenarios into additional three dummy variables, AHLC, LCAH, and LCONLY respectively to test our results in the robustness
checks.
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and Lev, 1995; Soffer et al., 2000; Baginski et al., 2000, 2002, 2004; Tucker, 2007). In detail, we control for the magni-
tude of the earnings change (ABSURP), the type of earnings news (BN), negative current earnings (LOSS), change from loss
to proﬁt (LTP), ﬁrm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MBRANKS), earnings volatility (EARN_VOLT), magnitude of earnings
change at industry-level (IND_SURP). Following Baginski et al. (2002), we employ the change in earnings (ABSURP) to
maximize the sample size. The bad news indicator (BN) considers the asymmetric behavior of management forecasts
(Skinner, 1994, 1997). Firm size (SIZE) captures many aspects of a ﬁrm’s operational and business environment, for
example, a ﬁrm’s political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and higher private information acquisition (higher infor-
mation demand) (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Hence, we include SIZE as the logarithm of the market value of equity at
the beginning of the ﬁscal year when ﬁrms issue warnings. Market-to-book ratio (MBRANKS), deﬁned as the decile rank
of the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the ﬁscal year, indicates a
ﬁrm’s investment opportunity set and growth potential. It captures the motive of growth ﬁrms to soften the earn-
ings-torpedo effect (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). In addition, management of unstable ﬁrms (high earnings volatility), lack-
ing real control, attempt to manage an illusion of control by attributing to themselves more credit for negative outcomes
(Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Baginski et al., 2000, 2004). Therefore, we use EARN_VOLT, measured as the standard deviation
of the earnings per share during the prior 4 ﬁscal periods, in order to capture the volatility of the business. Two other
indicators, negative current earnings (LOSS) and a change from a loss to a proﬁt (LTP) are to cover the mainland’s rules.
At last, we add a group of indicator variables to control the effects from SOE companies (SOE), year, industry, market
segments (main board stock or GEM stock), and interim or annual results.
4.2. Regression speciﬁcation
Based on the above arguments, we use the following logistic model to examine the impact of AH peer’s spillovers on other
ﬁrms.ProbðWarni;t ¼ 1Þ ¼ Uðd0 þ d1AHONLYi;j;t þ Controlsþ i;j;tÞ ð1ÞWarni,t equal to 1 if the ﬁrm i makes a proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t
AHONLYi,j,t equal to 1 if AND ONLY if for non-AH ﬁrm i in industry j, no other non-AH ﬁrms made but at least one AH
ﬁrm in industry j made a proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t before ﬁrm i’s actionControls:ABSURPi,t equals the absolute value of the change in net income between event ﬁscal period t and same ﬁscal
period last year deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal period last yearBNi,t equal to 1 if the change in net income between event ﬁscal period t and same ﬁscal period last year
deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal period last year is <0, otherwise, 0LOSSi,t equal to 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period t is <0, otherwise, 0
LTPi,t equal to 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period t is >0 and the net income of the same ﬁscal period
last year is <0; otherwise, 0
SIZEi,t equals the logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the event year t
MBRANKSi,t is the decile rank of the market to book ratio at the beginning of the event year, and is coded from
0 to 9
EARN_VOLTi,t equals the standard deviation of the annual return on assets for the last 4 years
IND_ABSURPi,t equals the absolute value of the change in industry net income between event ﬁscal period t and same
ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by industry net income for the same ﬁscal period last year
SOEi,t equal to 1 if ﬁrm i is a SOE company, otherwise 0If d1 is positive and signiﬁcant, we conclude that non-AH ﬁrms are more likely to warn if there is no other non-AH ﬁrms but
at least one AH peer issuing a proﬁt warning announcement, i.e. a spillover effect exists from AH ﬁrms to non-AH ﬁrms. Fur-
thermore, a positive relation between AHONLY and WARN would imply that: (1) not many non-AH ﬁrms make their proﬁt
warnings as leading announcers; and (2) non-AH ﬁrms follow their AH peers to disclose big earnings surprises but do not
follow their non-AH peers.
4.3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The HKSE provides investors with listed-company ﬁlings and maintains all price-sensitive information announcements
from 1999 till nowin its HKEx News online searching system. We choose the sample period from 2003 to 2009. The period
starts with 2003 because of the passage of the Guide on Price-Sensitive Information in Hong Kong. We collect the warning
Table 2
(A) Sample selection procedure. (B) Proﬁt warnings distributed across ﬁscal years. (C) Fiscal periods distributed across market segments. (D) Proﬁt warnings
distributed across market segments. (E) Proﬁt warnings distributed by good and bad news. (F) Timeliness of proﬁt warnings.
Annual Interim Total
(A)
Total proﬁt warnings 552 301 853
Less: forecasted year is before 2003 or after 2008 46 99 145
Less: lost due to changes in Datastream coverage 191 58 247
Listed on Datastream 315 144 459
Less: missing Datastream data 106 55 161
Complete data on Datastream 209 89 298
Year # of warnings
Interim Annual
Good news Bad news Good news Bad news
(B)
2003 9 9 9 9
2004 6 6 9 9
2005 6 11 9 13
2006 3 7 10 9
2007 12 7 22 26
2008 4 9 14 70
Total 40 49 73 136
# of obs. AH Non-AH
All Non-China
(C)
Main board 331 4682 4448
GEM 0 833 600
Total 331 5515 5048
# of warnings AH Non-AH
All Non-China
(D)
Main board 106 176 160
GEM 0 16 11
Total 106 192 171
AH Non-AH
All Non-China
(E)
Good news
# of warnings 77 36 34
% of warnings 72.64 18.75 19.77
Bad news
# of warnings 29 156 138
% of warnings 27.36 81.25 80.23
Total proﬁt warnings
# of warnings 106 192 172
% of warnings 100.00 100.00 100.00
# of days to ﬁscal period end AH Non-AH
All Non-China
(F)
Mean 13.42 29.34 31.81
Std. Dev. 41.60 57.17 58.50
Min. 114 28 28
25% 15 14 12
Median 7 19.5 21.5
75% 62 56 56
Max. 117 186 186
AH: Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms; Non-AH: listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong market, excluding AH ﬁrms; Non-AH and Non-China: non-AH ﬁrms in Hong Kong,
excluding H shares and Red Chips; good news: earnings change is not less than zero, otherwise, bad news.
R. Wang, Y. Zhang / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 63–80 71
AH Firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
<-4 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5 -2.1 -1.7 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4
Change 100% in Earnings
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Non-Warning Firms
Warning Firm
Non-AH Firms
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
<-4 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5 -2.1 -1.7 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4
Change 100% in Earnings
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Non-Warning Firms
Warning Firm
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Warning ﬁrms distributed by percentage of earnings changes (AH sample). (b) Warning ﬁrms distributed by percentage of earnings changes
(non-AH sample).
72 R. Wang, Y. Zhang / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 63–80announcements after June 25, 2007 from the HKSE website and stop on April 30, 2009.14 We then manually collect the rest of
warnings data from Bloomberg.15 All ﬁnancial information and stock market data are from the Datastream database.
Table 2, Panel A reports the proﬁt warnings sample selection process. 5846 ﬁscal periods with 298 proﬁt warning
announcements are available. During the sample period, 2003–2009, companies in the Hong Kong market issued 853 warn-
ings about interim and annual earnings. In addition to events excluded due to company coverage in Datastream, we also de-
lete events that don’t have enough ﬁnancial data to calculate variables in the model. As a result, the ﬁnal number of warnings
is 298, which includes 209 warnings for annual earnings and 89 warnings for interim earnings.
Panel B of Table 2 further summarizes proﬁt warnings distributed across ﬁscal years. Consistent with previous literature,
managers are not only reluctant to disclose warning news, but are also more likely to warn if the news is bad. Panel C of
Table 2 shows no ﬁrm-ﬁscal period observations of AH ﬁrms in GEM. Both for AH and non-AH ﬁrms, the Main Board market
includes more observations. There are more warnings on the Main Board than GEM. Based on the results in the Panel E,
partly because of the clear cut-off and symmetric rule in mainland China, AH ﬁrms make a higher percentage of good news
warnings than non-AH ﬁrms. Panel F conﬁrms that AH ﬁrms issue proﬁt warnings on a more timely basis than non-AH ﬁrms.
Moreover, these results in Table 2 remind us to control for year, ﬁscal period (annual or interim) and market segment effects
in warning behavior.14 We include all quarterly result announcements of ﬁscal period t-1, if these announcements contain any proﬁt warning information on ﬁscal period t. In
practice, many AH ﬁrms issue their warnings with their quarterly results.
15 We also match the news data from Bloomberg with the price-sensitive information ﬁlings in the HKSE website to make sure our sample is complete. One of
the seminar participants was concerned whether listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong do not only ﬁle proﬁt warnings to HKSE ofﬁcially, but rather choose other
communication channels to inform the markets of their earnings news. We use the key words ‘‘proﬁt/earning + warning/surprise/estimate’’, ‘‘signiﬁcantly/
substantially/signiﬁcant/substantial/expected + increase/decrease/change/surge/decline’’, ‘‘expected/estimated/expectation on + improvement/performance/
ﬁnancial results’’, and ‘‘’’ to search for the warning news in the Wisenews database. The results almost match perfectly with our proﬁt warning announcement
data from the HKSE website and Bloomberg. Only two additional pieces of news are not included previously. These two indicate that two non-AH ﬁrms
announced through press releases a refusal to make any proﬁt warnings. We add these two non-proﬁt warnings into our proﬁt warning sample. Moreover, this
additional search in the Wisenews database shows that listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong do not choose other communication channels but only the ofﬁcial ﬁling to
HKSE to inform the market of their earnings news.
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Fig. 3. (a) Warning ﬁrms distributed by percentage of earnings changes (non-AH sample, AHONLY = 1). (b) Warning ﬁrms distributed by percentage of
earnings changes (non-AH sample, AHONLY = 0).
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5.1. Variable distributions and descriptive statistics
Fig. 2a and b describe the frequency of ﬁrms that make proﬁt warnings based on the percentage of earnings changes. In
the AH sample, ﬁrms start to warn about their earnings when earnings changes reach 30%, but non-AH ﬁrms make warnings
for even less than 10% changes in their earnings. On average, however, AH ﬁrms make more warnings than non-AH ﬁrms
(66.01% vs. 4.29%). Fig. 3a and b provide us with a detailed picture of non-AH ﬁrm warnings distributed by the percentage
of earnings changes, conditional on whether a AH peer warns or not (AHONLY = 1 or 0). Non-AH ﬁrms under AH peer pressure
(Fig. 3a, AHONLY = 1) have a higher percentage of warnings than non-AH ﬁrms without AH peer pressure (Fig. 3b,
AHONLY = 0). This univariate result conﬁrms our hypothesis that non-AH ﬁrms are more likely to warn if their AH peers make
proﬁt warning announcements (5.84% vs. 3.60%).
Table 3, Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the variables in our regressions. All control variables are winsorized at
the lower and upper one percentile. Both ﬁrm- and industry-level earnings changes of non-AH ﬁrms are larger than their AH
counterparts. AH ﬁrms tend to be large ﬁrms, thus both the mean and median natural logarithm of market capitalization are
about 16. The average earnings volatility of AH ﬁrms is 3.77, the absolute value of which is also bigger than non-AH ﬁrms.
5.2. Primary results
5.2.1. Tests of Hypotheses 1–3
Table 4 presents the logistic regression test of H1, including two subsample tests, H2a and b. We ﬁrst regress the warn
dummy on the control variables. These results are consistent with Tucker (2007) and Baginski et al. (2002) and imply our
controls are effective for the Hong Kong market. Then we add our main independent variable, AHONLY, into the model. As
H1 predicts, the coefﬁcient of AHONLY in the second column is signiﬁcantly positive (1.01, z = 2.44), indicating that non-
AH ﬁrms depend on their AH peers’ behavior when issuing proﬁt warnings. These results still hold after controlling for
the expected positive effects of ABSURP (positive; z = 2.37), bad news warnings (BN) (positive; z = 2.13), negative earnings
news (LOSS) (positive; z = 2.22) and positive earnings news after a loss in the previous ﬁscal period (LTP) (positive;
Table 3
(A) Descriptive statistics. (B) Descriptive statistics of warning and non-warning ﬁrms. (C) Descriptive statistics of non-AH ﬁrms by AHONLY.
Classiﬁcation variable
WARN WARN = 1 # of obs. % WARN = 0 # of obs. %
(A)
AH 38 12.97 293 87.03
Non-AH 191 3.46 5324 96.54
AHONLY AHONLY = 1 # of obs. % AHONLY = 0 # of obs. %
Non-AH 286 4.89 5560 95.11
Continuous variable
ABSURP Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Median 75th Max.
AH 1.25 3.97 0.00 0.16 0.40 0.97 51.10
Non-AH 2.50 6.94 0.00 0.26 0.66 1.50 51.10
Classiﬁcation variables
BN BN = 1 # of obs. % BN = 0 # of obs. %
AH 95 28.70 236 71.30
Non-AH 2165 39.26 3350 60.74
LOSS LOSS = 1 # of obs. % LOSS = 0 # of obs. %
AH 18 5.44 313 94.56
Non-AH 1410 2.56 4105 74.43
LTP LTP = 1 # of obs. % LTP = 0 # of obs. %
AH 9 2.72 322 97.28
Non-AH 502 9.10 5013 90.90
Other control variables
SIZE Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Median 75th Max.
AH 16.08 1.84 12.77 14.64 16.17 17.17 21.41
Non-AH 13.65 2.07 14.97 12.19 13.40 14.97 21.74
MBRANKS Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Median 75th Max.
AH 5.32 2.08 1 4 5 7 9
Non-AH 4.45 2.90 0 2 4 7 9
EARN_VOLT Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Median 75th Max.
AH 3.77 .94 7.30 4.39 3.76 3.09 1.98
Non-AH 2.59 1.59 9.01 3.54 2.72 1.79 4.36
IND_ABSURP Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Median 75th Max.
AH 0.62 0.93 0.00 0.14 0.36 0.82 7.34
Non-AH 0.85 1.22 0.00 0.15 0.47 0.96 7.34
AH Non-AH Non-AH and Non-China
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(B)
WARN = 1 ABSURP 3.69 0.99 5.25 1.37 5.09 1.34
SIZE 16.23 15.98 14.28 14.33 14.29 14.32
MBRANKS 5.37 5 4.01 4 4.04 4
EARN_VOLT 3.73 3.65 2.71 2.96 2.59 2.91
IND_ABSURP 0.91 0.50 0.89 0.72 0.93 0.78
WARN = 0 ABSURP 1.16 0.42 3.67 0.63 3.58 0.65
SIZE 16.09 16.19 13.63 13.35 12.59 12.31
MBRANKS 5 5.32 4 4.47 4 4.40
EARN_VOLT 3.79 3.78 2.08 2.11 2.20 2.62
IND_ABSURP 0.57 0.31 0.83 0.45 0.86 0.47
Non-AH
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Diff. t (z)
(C)
AHONLY = 1 ABSURP 1.61 0.64 4.48 0.01 51.10 2.51
SIZE 13.76 13.32 2.17 9.62 21.22 0.83
MBRANKS 5.86 5 2.84 1 10 2.24
EARN_VOLT 2.67 2.72 1.71 7.35 3.06 0.84
IND_ABSURP 0.76 0.41 0.89 0.00 7.43 1.34
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Table 3 (continued)
Non-AH
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Diff. t (z)
AHONLY = 0 ABSURP 2.53 0.66 7.02 0.01 51.10 (1.15)
SIZE 13.65 13.41 2.06 7.79 21.73 (0.37)
MBRANKS 5.43 5 2.90 1 10 (2.25)
EARN_VOLT 2.58 2.77 1.58 9.01 4.36 (1.14)
IND_ABSURP 1.04 0.49 3.24 0.00 8.19 (3.67)
AH: Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms; Non-AH: listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong market, excluding AH ﬁrms; Non-AH and Non-China: Non-AH ﬁrms in Hong Kong market,
excluding H shares and Red Chips; AHONLY: equals 1 if and ONLY IF a AH peer warns its earnings performance before the ﬁrm makes any decisions of proﬁt
warning in ﬁscal period t; ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year
deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal period last year; BN: equals 1 if the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last
year deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal period last year is <0, otherwise, 0; LOSS: equals 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period is <0, otherwise,
0; LTP: equals 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period is >0 and the net income of the same ﬁscal period last year is <0; otherwise, 0; SIZE: equals the
logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the event year; MBRANKS: is the decile rank of the market to book ratio at the beginning of the
event year, and is coded from 0 to 9; EARN_VOLT: equals the standard deviation of the annual return on assets for the last 4 years; IND_ABSURP: equals the
absolute value of the change in industry net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by industry net income for the
same ﬁscal period last year; SOE: equals 1 if ﬁrm i is SOE company, otherwise, 0.
Table 4
Logistic regression of the decision to issue proﬁt warnings for Non-AH ﬁrms: Prob(Warni,t = 1) =U(d0 + d1AHONLYi,j,t + Controls + ei,j,t).
Variables Predicted sign Non-AH (H1) (H2a) Non-AH and Non-
China
(H2b)
Non-AH Non-AH and China Non-AH matched
sample
Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z
AHONLY + 1.01 2.44** 1.77 2.13** 0.41 1.77* 2.68 3.41***
ABSURP + 0.02 2.67*** 0.01 2.37** 0.02 0.90 0.02 3.21*** 0.44 0.84
BN + 1.56 2.20** 0.42 2.13** 3.63 2.59*** 1.39 3.10*** – –
LOSS + 0.68 2.17** 0.57 2.22** 1.45 0.94 0.60 2.88*** 1.34 2.14**
LTP + 0.90 0.63 0.14 0.61 2.00 1.03 0.74 6.11*** – –
SIZE + 0.23 2.72*** 0.34 2.10** 0.34 0.25 0.15 1.00 0.32 2.56**
MBRANKS + 0.16 1.70* 0.12 1.74* 0.25 0.29 0.17 1.86* 0.12 2.36**
EARN_VOLT ? 0.19 3.43*** 0.29 3.37*** 0.79 2.39** 0.14 2.00** 0.77 1.81*
IND_ABSURP + 0.64 4.11*** 1.06 4.14*** 0.94 1.17 0.63 2.77*** 1.00 3.65***
SOE + 1.17 2.33** 1.57 2.52** 2.12 2.21** N/A N/A 0.99 2.11**
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mkt seg. dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interim/annual dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 5515 5515 467 5048 331
Wald Chi2 825.80 873.73 93.82 678.15 142.29
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 27.01% 30.00% 44.85% 29.38% 38.62%
When estimating the coefﬁcients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across ﬁscal periods of a given
industry. We include dummies for year, industry, market segment and interim or annual results in the regressions to control for temporal ﬁxed effects; the
results are not tabulated.
Non-AH: listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong market, excluding AH ﬁrms; Non-AH and Non-China: Non-AH ﬁrms in Hong Kong market, excluding H shares and Red
Chips; Non-AH and China: Non-AH ﬁrms that are H shares and Red Chips; AHONLY: equals 1 if and ONLY IF a AH peer warns its earnings performance before
the ﬁrm makes any decisions of proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t; ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the change in net income between event ﬁscal period
and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal period last year; BN: equals 1 if the change in net income between event ﬁscal
period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal period last year is <0, otherwise, 0; LOSS: equals 1 if the net income of the
event ﬁscal period is <0, otherwise, 0; LTP: equals 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period is >0 and the net income of the same ﬁscal period last year is
<0; otherwise, 0; SIZE: equals the logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of the event year; MBRANKS: is the decile rank of the market to
book ratio at the beginning of the event year, and is coded from 0 to 9; EARN_VOLT: equals the standard deviation of the annual return on assets for the last 4
years; IND_ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the change in industry net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by
industry net income for the same ﬁscal period last year; SOE: equals 1 if ﬁrm i is SOE company, otherwise, 0.
* p < 10%, two-tailed.
** p < 5%, two-tailed.
*** p < 1%, two-tailed.
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VOLT, negative; z = 3.37), industry earnings news (IND_ABSURP, positive; z = 4.14) and SOE dummy (positive; z = 2.52).
As for H2a and b, we also report the results of Eq. (1) for these different sub-samples in Table 4. After controlling for other
determinants of issuing proﬁt warnings, in the column ‘‘Non-AH and China’’, the coefﬁcient on AHONLY (1.77, z = 2.13) is
more signiﬁcant for the Chinese non-AH ﬁrms (Red Chips and H Shares). But the coefﬁcient on AHONLY becomes weaker
Table 5
Logistic regression of the decision to issue proﬁtwarnings for non-AHﬁrms byAHCAP_M and AHCAP_IND: Prob(Warni,t = 1) =U(d0 + d1AHONLYi,j,t + Controls + ei,j,t).
Variables Predicted sign H3a H3b
High AHCAP_M Mid AHCAP_M Low AHCAP_M High AHCAP_IND Mid AHCAP_IND Low AHCAP_IND
Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z
AHONLY + 1.52 3.17*** 1.11 1.79* 0.21 0.96 0.61 1.51 1.29 5.91*** 0.03 1.13
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mkt seg. dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interim/annual dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 1512 3280 1054 1659 899 2957
Wald Chi2 316.47 270.09 60.46 111.90 290.34 285.54
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 33.32% 32.50% 25.04% 27.48% 31.54% 32.67%
When estimating the coefﬁcients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across ﬁscal periods of a given
industry. We include dummies for year, industry, market segment and interim or annual results in the regressions to control for temporal ﬁxed effects; the
results are not tabulated.
AHONLY: equals to 1 if and ONLY IF a AH peer warns its earnings performance before the ﬁrm makes any decisions of proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t;
ABSURP: equals to the absolute value of the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for the
same ﬁscal period last year; BN: equals 1 if the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for
the same ﬁscal period last year is <0, otherwise, 0; LOSS: equals 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period is <0, otherwise, 0; LTP: equals 1 if the net
income of the event ﬁscal period is >0 and the net income of the same ﬁscal period last year is <0; otherwise, 0; SIZE: equals the logarithm of the market
value of equity at the beginning of the event year; MBRANKS: is the decile rank of the market to book ratio at the beginning of the event year, and is coded
from 0 to 9; EARN_VOLT: equals the standard deviation of the annual return on assets for the last 4 years; IND_ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the
change in industry net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by industry net income for the same ﬁscal period last
year; AHCAP_M: equals market capitalization of AH ﬁrms in period t over total market capital of all ﬁrms in period t; AHCAP_IND: equals market
capitalization of AH ﬁrms in industry j in period t over total market capital of industry j in period t; SOE: equals 1 if ﬁrm i is SOE company, otherwise, 0.
* p < 10%, two-tailed.
** p < 5%, two-tailed.
*** p < 1%, two-tailed.
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The results are consistent with our H2a, i.e. the likelihood that non-AH ﬁrms do warn if their AH peers make proﬁt warning
announcements is more pronounced when non-AH ﬁrms are H shares and Red Chips. As we discussed in the previous sec-
tion, we think there are two possible reasons for such differences: (1) the impact from AH ﬁrms depends on the level of how
much non-AH ﬁrm’s news shares a common market/industry environment with their AH counterparts (Dye and Sridhar,
1995). Non-Chinese ﬁrms might share less common market/industry factors with their AH counterparts; (2) non-Chinese
ﬁrms in the Hong Kong market are composed of many penny ﬁrms, which are too small in terms of their size and market
capitalization. Therefore, these small ﬁrms are not real industry counterparts with AH peers.
To further conﬁrm these two explanations, we also test H2b based on a matched sample of non-AH ﬁrms by size and
industry on a ﬁscal-period basis with AH ﬁrms (Albuquerque, 2009). The results presented in Table 4, column ‘‘Non-AH
matching sample’’, show that in the AH matched sample, d1 holds for AHONLY (2.68, z = 3.41) and is more signiﬁcant than
the other sub-samples.
In summary, the main results reported in Table 4 indicate that after controlling for other factors that inﬂuence the warn-
ing decision, non-AH ﬁrms are more likely to warn about their earnings news if a AH peer has also warned. Moreover, this
positive relationship is more pronounced if non-AH ﬁrms share more common market/industry factors with their AH peers.
To investigate whether the spillover effect becomes greater with growth of the AH ﬁrms’ market power, we divide AH
ﬁrms into three groups based on their market capitalization. We expect with more AH ﬁrms listing in the Hong Kong market,
they provide more information about their industries. Therefore, our H3 implies the spillover effect should become greater
with the increase in growth of AH ﬁrms. In Table 5, to test H3a, we sort ﬁrm-periods into three groups based on the percent-
age of market capitalization of AH ﬁrms over total market capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (AHCAP_M) in each
ﬁscal period. We ﬁnd that coefﬁcients on AHONLY increase when market capitalization of AH ﬁrms in Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change (AHCAP_M) becomes greater (Low: 0.21, z = 0.96; Middle: 1.11, z = 1.79; High: 1.52, z = 3.17). To test H3b, in addi-
tion, we sort our sample into three groups based on the percentage of market capitalization of AH ﬁrms within each industry
(AHCAP_IND) in each ﬁscal period. Only the coefﬁcient on AHONLY in the middle group of AHCAP_IND is signiﬁcant (Low:
0.03, z = 1.13; Middle: 1.29, z = 5.91; High: 0.61, z = 1.51). In sum, the results in Table 5 are consistent with H3a, which
implies that the spillover effect from AH ﬁrms depends on the extent of how many non-AH ﬁrms share common market/
industry factors with their AH counterparts. Rather, our results do not support H3b. We think the possible explanation is
that if a AH ﬁrm has a low market share in one industry, the spillover is weak (Hou, 2007). In addition, if the AH ﬁrms dom-
inate their industries, investors cannot ﬁnd a proper comparable ﬁrm to match with, so the spillover effect is diminished.
Table 6
Logistic regression of the decision to issue proﬁt warnings for non-AH ﬁrms by good and bad news: Prob(Warni,t = 1) =U(d0 + d1AHONLYi,j,t + Controls + ei,j,t).
Variables Predicted sign Non-AH Non-AH and Non-China
Good news Bad news Good news Bad news
Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z Coff. Z
AHONLY + 0.44 0.99 1.19 3.12** 1.42 1.07 0.19 1.78*
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market segment dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interim/annual dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of obs. 3350 2165 3058 1990
Wald Chi2 110.95 260.27 129.36 265.69
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 25.81% 31.44% 26.44% 32.40%
When estimating the coefﬁcients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across ﬁscal periods of a given
industry. We include dummies for year, industry, market segment and interim or annual results in the regressions to control for temporal ﬁxed effects; the
results are not tabulated.
Non-AH: listed ﬁrms in Hong Kong market, excluding AH ﬁrms; Non-AH and Non-China: non-AH ﬁrms in Hong Kong market, excluding H shares and Red
Chips; AHONLY: equals 1 if and ONLY IF a AH peer warns its earnings performance before the ﬁrm makes any decisions of proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t;
ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for the
same ﬁscal period last year; BN: equals 1 if the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for
the same ﬁscal period last year is <0, otherwise, 0; LOSS: equals 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period is <0, otherwise, 0; LTP: equals 1 if the net
income of the event ﬁscal period is >0 and the net income of the same ﬁscal period last year is <0; otherwise, 0; SIZE: equals the logarithm of the market
value of equity at the beginning of the event year; MBRANKS: is the decile rank of the market to book ratio at the beginning of the event year, and is coded
from 0 to 9; EARN_VOLT: equals the standard deviation of the annual return on assets for the last 4 years; IND_ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the
change in industry net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by industry net income for the same ﬁscal period last
year.
* p < 10%, two-tailed.
** p < 5%, two-tailed.
*** p < 1%, two-tailed.
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good news and 2165 convey bad news. The AHONLY coefﬁcients are only signiﬁcant for bad news. For non-China-afﬁliated
ﬁrms, the results (in the column ‘‘Non-AH and Non-China’’) are similar. Therefore, managers in non-AH ﬁrms are more likely
to issue bad-news warnings if their AH peers made such warnings. On the other hand, these non-AH managers are reluctant
to make good-news announcements, even if their AH peers disclose good news. The asymmetric results are consistent with
the ﬁndings by Skinner (1994, 1997), Tse and Tucker (2010). Cheng and Leung (2006) may offer another reason why Hong
Kong ﬁrms are inclined to withhold good news. They ﬁnd Hong Kong managers withhold good news and buy the shares of
their own ﬁrms before the earnings news is released.
The asymmetric disclosure of good and bad news implies that if we only ﬁnd evidence of the interdependence of proﬁt
warnings between AH and non-AH ﬁrms when they have bad news, but not good news, then we cannot reject the alternative
explanation that what we document simply is a post hoc fallacy. As discussed previously, testing of H4 will help to distin-
guish between these two explanations.5.2.2. Tests of Hypothesis 4
With respect to H4, the results are also consistent with our expectations. In Table 7, we provide empirical evidence of our
arguments by estimating the logistic model separately on observations ranked by their magnitude of ABSURP. We form
groups based on quartile cutoffs. Speciﬁcally, the bottom group consists of ﬁrms where ABSURP is below 26% (bottom
25% of ﬁrms). The middle two groups contain ﬁrms with ABSURP of 26% to 66% and 66% to 151%. The top group consists
of the 25% of ﬁrms in which ABSURP is at its highest, at least 151%. Ceteris paribus, this top group is most likely to be material
and thus most likely to be forced to disclose, which implies that the spillover effects from AH peers should have little and
insigniﬁcant explanatory power.
In our sample period, no AH ﬁrms with less than 30% earnings change makes a proﬁt warning. Thus, it is important to
remember that we can get more powerful evidence of the spillover effect, if we ﬁnd non-AH ﬁrms with ‘‘immaterial’’ earn-
ings news (e.g. <30%) are also more likely to warn if a AH peer with ‘‘material’’ earnings news has made a proﬁt warning.
Compared to big earnings changes (e.g. >30%), this scenario lowers the possibility that non-AH ﬁrms warn after AH peers
simply because they have a similar duty to disclose similar material earnings news as their AH peers. Thus this subsample
test mitigates the post-hoc fallacy in our design.16 Panel B of Table 7 reports the results.16 We admit that the ‘‘interdependence’’ of disclosure also exists within non-AH ﬁrms. But we can hardly have a powerful test to argue this interdependence is
based on a simple post-hoc relation for the pure non-AH sample.
Table 7
(A) and (B) Descriptive statistics of non-AH ﬁrms by ABSURP.
Partitions by ABSURP
Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th Median 75th Max.
(A)
<26%
ABSURP 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.26
BN 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 1 1
LOSS 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 1 1
LTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SIZE 14.24 2.15 8.78 12.71 14.02 15.57 21.22
MBRANKS 4.47 2.48 0 1 3 6 9
EARN_VOLT 2.95 1.61 9.01 3.91 3.08 2.22 3.83
IND_ABSURP 0.68 1.40 0.00 0.13 0.33 0.70 15.75
26–66%
ABSURP
BN 0.39 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
LOSS 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
LTP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SIZE 13.85 2.10 8.80 12.35 13.60 15.21 21.12
MBRANKS 4.45 4 0 2 4 7 9
EARN_VOLT 2.68 1.53 7.47 3.57 2.87 1.94 3.73
IND_ABSURP 0.92 3.61 0.00 0.15 0.41 0.84 7.34
66–151%
ABSURP 0.98 0.23 0.66 0.79 0.94 1.14 1.51
BN 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
LOSS 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1
LTP 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
SIZE 13.47 13.18 8.26 11.94 13.19 14.79 21.74
MBRANKS 3.95 2.88 0 1 3 6 9
EARN_VOLT 2.50 1.58 7.47 3.39 2.50 1.60 4.35
IND_ABSURP 1.52 4.34 0.00 0.21 0.58 1.29 8.19
>151%
ABSURP 8.45 12.06 1.51 2.14 3.48 7.90 51.10
BN 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
LOSS 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
LTP 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1
SIZE 13.04 1.69 7.79 11.80 12.90 14.05 18.41
MBRANKS 3.87 2.98 0 1 3 6 9
EARN_VOLT 2.30 1.55 9.01 3.24 2.39 1.64 3.83
IND_ABSURP 1.19 1.61 0.00 0.21 0.59 1.34 7.34
Partitions by ABSURP AHONLY Z Controls Pseudo R2 Prob > Chi2
(B)
0–26% 0.36 0.63 Yes 24.75% 0.000
26–66% 2.34 3.47*** Yes 31.30% 0.000
66–151% 1.77 4.21*** Yes 25.17% 0.000
>151% 0.63 1.37 Yes 25.68% 0.000
AHONLY: equals 1 if and ONLY IF a AH peer warns its earnings performance before the ﬁrm makes any decisions of proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t; ABSURP:
equals the absolute value of the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for the same ﬁscal
period last year; BN: equals 1 if the change in net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by net income for the same
ﬁscal period last year is <0, otherwise, 0; LOSS: equals 1 if the net income of the event ﬁscal period is <0, otherwise, 0; LTP: equals 1 if the net income of the
event ﬁscal period is >0 and the net income of the same ﬁscal period last year is <0; otherwise, 0; SIZE: equals the logarithm of the market value of equity at
the beginning of the event year; MBRANKS: is the decile rank of the market to book ratio at the beginning of the event year, and is coded from 0 to 9;
EARN_VOLT: equals the standard deviation of the annual return on assets for the last 4 years; IND_ABSURP: equals the absolute value of the change in
industry net income between event ﬁscal period and same ﬁscal period last year deﬂated by industry net income for the same ﬁscal period last year.
When estimating the coefﬁcients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across ﬁscal periods of a given
industry. We include dummies for year, industry, market segment and interim or annual results in the regressions to control for temporal ﬁxed effects; the
results are not tabulated.
⁄ p < 10%, two-tailed.
⁄⁄ p < 5%, two-tailed.
*** p < 1%, two-tailed.
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ﬁrms (0.36, z = 0.63). In unreported tables, earnings surprise (ABSURP, z = 2.10), bad earnings news (BN, z = 2.00) and ﬁrm
size (SIZE, z = 1.83) signiﬁcantly determine the disclosure decision. We report estimates from the same model for ﬁrms with
ABSURP between 26% and 66% and ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on AHONLY becomes positive and signiﬁcant (2.34, z = 3.47). For
ABSURP between 66% and 151%, we also ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on AHONLY is positive and signiﬁcant but becomes weaker in
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surprise of non-AH ﬁrms is greater. For both of the middle groups of ABSURP, other controls, earnings surprise (ABSURP,
z = 2.93, 1.98), bad earnings news (BN, z = 3.58, 4.65), and ﬁrm size (SIZE, z = 2.56, 1.79) still hold their positive relationships
with the disclosure decision. Moreover, the coefﬁcients of negative earnings news (LOSS) (positive; z = 4.23, 2.54) and posi-
tive earnings news after a loss in the previous ﬁscal period (LTP) (positive; z = 1.74, 1.85) which are not signiﬁcant in the
bottom group become signiﬁcant.
To see further evidence that materiality forces non-AH managers to disclose proﬁt warnings, independent of AH peer
pressure, we report results for the group with the highest ABSURP. The coefﬁcient on AHONLY becomes smaller and statis-
tically insigniﬁcant (z = 1.41). ABSURP itself has no signiﬁcant positive effect on disclosure either. The results are consistent
with H4. They imply that ﬁrms with more ‘‘material’’ earnings news have a duty to disclose such material information. As a
result, if the magnitude of earnings news is larger than the ‘‘threshold’’ of materiality, it has little explanatory power on the
disclosure decision. Also, compared to ﬁrms with lower ABSURP, ﬁrms in the top group of ABSURP are more independent in
making their warning decisions. These results arise after controlling for BN (z = 3.57), SIZE (z = 2.38), and MB, LTP and EARN-
VOLT (insigniﬁcant). Therefore, the result in the Top ABSURP group in Table 6 shows that spillover effects from AH ﬁrms have
little power on their non-AH peers when the earnings news is material.
In summary, the results of testing spillover effects via sub-groups of ABSURP conﬁrm H4. Spillover effects from AH ﬁrms
are strongest in the lower ABSURP group—when earnings news is immaterial, non-AH peers are more likely to lower the dis-
closure threshold and consequently some news that was previously withheld is now disclosed. However, the spillover effects
diminish with the increase in the magnitude of the earnings news. Because when such news becomes more material, man-
agers in non-AH ﬁrms have a duty to disclose this material information. Therefore, spillover effects from AH peers are
weaker.6. Additional tests
6.1. Alternative proxy for spillovers from AH peers: AHWARN
Throughout the paper, we use the indicator variable, AHONLY, as a proxy for the spillover effect from AH ﬁrms to non-AH
peers. As deﬁned in the above section, AHONLY is an understated measure of this spillover effect, because we disregard two
situations AH ﬁrms could still possibly inﬂuence their non-AH peers on the decision to warn or not to warn. First, after a AH
ﬁrm warns, there is a non-AH peer that has also warned about its proﬁt before other non-AH ﬁrms do. Second, AH ﬁrms are
not the ﬁrst movers, but follow non-AH peers in issuing proﬁt warnings. In these situations, we cannot make clear-cut con-
clusions as to whether non-AH ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by AH ﬁrms or other non-AH peers. However, the measurements based
on the above two situations overstate the AH ﬁrm’s spillover effects. In the additional test section, we conduct a robustness
check on these two situations by using an alternative proxy, AHWARN, equal to 1 if a AH peer warns about its earnings per-
formance before the ﬁrm makes any decision about its proﬁt warning in ﬁscal period t. Our main results in Tables 3–6 con-
tinue to hold. In particular, as we expect, we ﬁnd that the spillover effect measured by AHWARN is greater than AHONLY.
6.2. Industry reclassiﬁcation
Our sample includes 61 industries based on SIC two-digit codes. Given that our hypotheses are based on intra-industry
effects, potential sensitivity might arise if we reclassify the sample industries. Moreover, industries are highly clustered in
Hong Kong, with ﬁnancial, real estate and industrials dominating the corporate landscape. Therefore, it is important to re-
test our hypotheses based on alternative industry classiﬁcations. We use both the Datastream sector data and SIC one-digit
codes to check our main results. We ﬁnd the coefﬁcients on AHONLY are still positive and signiﬁcant.7. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effects of a regulatory ‘‘spillover effect’’ between Chinese and Hong Kong ﬁrms. More spe-
ciﬁcally, we investigate whether Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms that are required to followmainland China’s mandatory disclosure
rules inﬂuence other listed ﬁrms under a voluntary disclosure rule in the Hong Kong market to issue proﬁt warnings. The
clear cut mandatory disclosure rule in mainland China forces Chinese ﬁrms to issue proﬁt warnings if they have more than
a 50% earnings change, negative bottom lines or positive earnings after a loss year, within one month after the ﬁscal period
end. We ﬁnd that these disclosures by Chinese dual-listed ﬁrms lower the disclosure threshold for Hong Kong ﬁrms and con-
sequently some news that was previously withheld by Hong Kong ﬁrms is now disclosed. In addition, the incentives to vol-
untarily disclose information must recognize that such information is often disclosed because of an underlying duty to
disclosure. Therefore, we expect the spillover effect from AH ﬁrms on non-AH ﬁrms to become weaker when the earnings
news is material.
The evidence presented above suggests that non-AH ﬁrms are more likely to warn if their AH peers make proﬁt warning
announcements. We further ﬁnd that for the non-AH ﬁrm side, this behavior is more pronounced if non-AH ﬁrms are Red
Chips and H shares or are in the same industry as AH ﬁrms with similar size. For the AH ﬁrm side, this spillover impact
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the industry. Lastly, this spillover effect diminishes with the increase in earnings surprise of non-AH ﬁrms. This implies that
disclosure behavior is more likely to be independent of peer’s actions when the news is material.
Although we ﬁnd that AH ﬁrms entice some of their non-AH peers to issue earnings news warnings, these warnings are
not issued on a timely basis. An interesting direction for future research involves studying the link between the timeliness of
proﬁt warnings of non-AH ﬁrms and their incentives to withhold or delay such information. Many of these late warnings are
disclosed only several days before the earnings announcement date that is 4 months after the ﬁscal year end. This long per-
iod gives insiders room to take advantage of private information to divert wealth away from public investors. We leave these
issues for further study.
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